Again, and again, the military men have seen themselves hurled into war by ambitions, passions, and blunders of civilian governments, almost wholly uninformed as to the limits of their military potentials and almost recklessly indifferent to the military requirements of the wars they let loose. Aware that they may again be thrown by civilians into an unforeseen conflict, perhaps with a foe they have not envisaged, these realistic military men find themselves unable to do anything save demand all the men, guns, and supplies they can possibly wring from the civilians, in the hope that they may be prepared or half prepared for whatever may befall them. In so doing they inevitably find themselves associated with militaristic military men who demand all they can get merely for the sake of having it without reference to ends.
-Alfred Vagts, History of Militarism (Rev. 1959), p. 33-34
At one time when I was feeling miserable and oppressed when I heard this. But when the Kashmir operation began, I began to feel proud of them, and every aeroplane that goes with materials and arms and ammunition and requirements of the Army, I feel proud.
Any injustice on our land, any encroachment on our land should ... be defended by violence, if not by non-violence ... If you can defend by non-violence, by all means you do it; that is the first thing I should like. If it is for me to do, I would not touch anything, either a pistol or revolver or anything. But I would not see India degrading itself to be feeling helpless.
Any injustice on our land, any encroachment on our land should ... be defended by violence, if not by non-violence ... If you can defend by non-violence, by all means you do it; that is the first thing I should like. If it is for me to do, I would not touch anything, either a pistol or revolver or anything. But I would not see India degrading itself to be feeling helpless.
-Gandhi to Sardar Patel, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, India's Iron Man, B Krishna, p. 377
Note: Patel had summoned all aeroplanes of private air lines through radio broadcast to rescue Kashmir from the attack of 'tribals'.
The roots of politicisation of the army are to be found in Nehru's hatred for the man in uniform. Soon after Independence the first commander-in-chief of the Indian armed forces, General Sir Robert Lockhart, presented a paper outlining a plan for the growth of the Indian Army to Prime Minister Nehru.
Nehru's reply: "We don't need a defence plan. Our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. You can scrap the army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs."
He didn't waste much time. On September 16, 1947, he directed that the army's then strength of 280,000 be brought down to 150,000. Even in fiscal 1950-51, when the Chinese threat had begun to loom large on the horizon, 50,000 army personnel were sent home as per his original plan to disband the armed forces.
After Independence, he once noticed a few men in uniform in a small office the army had in North Block, and angrily had them evicted.
It was only after the 1947-48 war in Jammu and Kashmir that he realised that the armed forces are an essential ingredient of any independent, sovereign nation. But he still wanted a compact army rather than great volume, whatever that meant. Defence requirements worked out after a careful assessment of threats carried no weight with him.
-Wing Commander (retd) R V Parasnis, Remebering a war, Rediff.com, Dec 05, 2002.
(R V Parasnis is probably the only air force pilot to have flown extensively as well as moved on foot in the NEFA area.)
(R V Parasnis is probably the only air force pilot to have flown extensively as well as moved on foot in the NEFA area.)
Soon after Independence, the Prime Minister held a meeting of senior army officers to elicit their views on retaining British officers as advisers. Nehru felt that Indian officers lacked the experience to take over responsibility for such a large army and wanted to retain British officers for a longer period, as Pakistan had done. While almost everyone agreed with Nehru, Nathu Singh objected:
Officers sitting here have more than 25 years' of service and are capable of holding senior appointments in the armed forces. As for experience, if I may ask you, Sir, what experience do you have to hold the post of Prime Minister?
There was a stunned silence, and Nehru did not reply. In the end, Nehru's proposal was accepted.
-Maj. Gen. VK Singh (ex Jt. Sec, RAW), Leadership in the Indian Army, p. 78
For the Prime Minister to go crawling to Jinnah, when we were the stronger side and in the right, would never be forgiven by the people of India.
- Patel, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, India's Iron Man, B Krishna, p. 385
The doctor operates only when the boil is fully ripe, so that the bleeding is the minimum and the patient suffers from as less pain as possible. We had adopted such a course in Hyderabad. We had been urged to operate there earlier. But we did not till the time was ripe, and everything turned out to be so well. It has come to my hearing that our Sikh bretheren wish to set up a Khalistan. If it is so, let them dare have a go at it! But I want to tell them that Hyderabad showed its teeth, and we had to pull them out. If our Sikh bretheren wish to do the same, they would meet the same fate. We turned the British out of India, (they) being foreigners. But the Rajas and Maharajas are like our children or brothers. They are, therefore, ours. We can make them understand. If, however, children refuse to understand, they have to be made to do so, even, if necessary, by slapping.
-Sardar Patel, Sardar: India's Iron Man, B Krishna, p. 440
Note: The above was said at a speech at Patiala when followers of Tara Singh created trouble. The audience retreated into a pin drop silence.
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.
d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.
If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate problems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with others. Even the question of defence of India assumes a different shape and cannot be isolated from other world factors. I think that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors. In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedly lead to world war. China, though internally big, is in a way amorphous and easily capable of being attacked, on its sea coasts and by air. In such a war, China would have its main front in the south and east and it wilt be fighting for its very existence against powerful enemies. It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major attack on India by China. I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective and world strategy and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.
While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.
If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which we cannot go at least for some years, and a spreading out of our -army in distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.
-Nehru, Note, Nov 18, 1950
Having foreseen the Chinese threat, he (Gen. Cariappa, CoAS) wanted to defend the border more effectively. In May 1951, he presented an outline plan for the defence of the North East Frotier Agency (NEFA). Nehru dismissed him saying that it was not the C-in-C's business to tell the Prime Minister how to defend the country. He advised Cariappa to worry only about Pakistan and Kashmir; as far as NEFA was concerned, the Chinese themselves would defend our frontiers!
-Maj. Gen. VK Singh (ex Jt. Sec, RAW), Leadership in the Indian Army, p. 43
Along the Indian-Chinese frontier, the longest frontier in the world between oppression and a democracy, Communist infiltrators are burrowing into the border states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim—which lie upon India's side of the great Himalayan battlement (see below). From this frontier, where ice-winds howl and lichen creeps around the tall mountains, an Indian Army Mission reported: "Long considered impregnable ... the frontier . . . [is] now looked upon as a possible route of infiltration, if not of invasion."
The Chinese are building all-weather, heavy-traffic roads across the mountains, linking their garrisons; they are opening Lhasa, the Forbidden City, to China proper and to Russia. Peking newspapers now reach Lhasa in ten days; before Mao they took several months. One 1,400-mile road starts from Sinkiang, at the edge of Russia, and curves through Tibet parallel to the Indian frontier (see map). From this strategic cord, side roads will point toward every major pass of the Himalayan mountains. The Chinese Communists are also laying down airfields in western Tibet, using Russian engineers and Russian equipment on all these projects.
The Defenders. For the record, India is not alarmed by the Communist threat. "We are delighted," says the External Affairs Ministry, "to see our backward neighbor making so much progress." Nehru has told the Indian army not to fortify the frontier itself, so as not to provoke the Chinese. "It's bloody rotten for us that the British never feared any danger from Tibet," one Indian officer grumbled last week. "They would have fortified all the passes and we could just move in and make tea. As it is now, if we even build a blockhouse on the border. Mr. Lung [meaning the Chinese] would think we were showing bad intentions." The officer pointed down the slope of the Himalayas. "That is why," he said, "we have to stay back there."
But Nehru is perfectly willing to organize the defense of India "back there"—an hour or so from the border. He gives the Indian army remarkable autonomy in such "military matters." When Lieut. General Thimayya was in command in Kashmir, for example, he dynamited every border pass within reach without bothering to check with Nehru. And "back there" today, India's generals are quietly mustering the bulk of the Indian army in a great line of camps that ranges, arclike, from Assam to Kashmir. Travelers report that Indian "militia" are everywhere, maneuvering in the field, crowding trucks on dusty mountain paths, riding the narrow-gauge railway that puffs up to the resort town of Darjeeling.
He had "serious doubts" about the P.W. explanations, said Nehru, because there had been "shouting and jeers" at the Communist explainers. He thought it "reasonable" to extend the period of explanations (as the Communists have demanded), and thought the P.W.s should not go free on Jan. 22, though that is what the armistice provides. Nehru then gave M.P.s the first sensation of the day: he snubbed his patient commander in Korea, Lieut. General K. S. Thimayya, who believes the P.W.s should go free on the 22nd. Nehru faintly praised Thimayya's "considerable ability," but snapped that India, and not Thimayya, was chairman of the neutral commission. "General Thimayya is not the chairman in his own personal capacity."
The ABC of Tibet. To such an indictment, the Communist opposition had little to add. But there were both conservatives and socialists who were distressed by the Prime Minister's position. Mme. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit agreed that any U.S.-Pakistan military pact would be unfortunate, but went on to imply a sisterly rebuke to brother Jawaharlal: India, she warned, must not develop a "fear psychosis." If the U.S. was charged with threatening the world, said she, "I am not prepared to believe it."
In the Upper House, Socialists objected to "the thought" of accepting aid from Russia, even if U.S. arms should be sent to Pakistan. So did many of Nehru's supporters, who called "No, No, No." But New Delhi papers reported that Nehru's ambassador in Moscow was in touch with Molotov about "undisclosed matters," and Nehru did not deny it.
One Socialist asked Nehru point-blank if it was not true that Red China was massing troops in Tibet (TIME. Nov. 23). He prodded Nehru: "Would not the deliberate and planned infiltration of our frontiers compel us to look at the situation with greater objectivity?"
Was it not true that Red China was building airfields in Tibet? "No doubt," replied Nehru smoothly. "The only way of getting across Tibet is by air." Nehru admitted that borderland Nepal was "in a somewhat fluid state—not a very satisfactory state"; he could not say, precisely, "how many persons" had crossed the Nepalese frontier from Red China. "But if there is any conception that there are preparations being made in Tibet for some kind of invasion of India, I think that is a complete mistake ... In the final analysis, if it takes place, we will resist it—so why get afraid of it?"
India's relations with Red China, said Nehru firmly, are "friendly." In this Nehrunian climax, the Prime Minister turned on his inquisitors: "Members seem to live in an unreal world," he remarked. "We should know the ABC of foreign policy before we start to talk about it."
Last week after four months silence, Nehru's government happily announced that at last it had won a "trade pact" with Red China. The terms: India to withdraw a tiny garrison it has maintained in Tibet for years to protect Indian merchants and pilgrims; India to let Red China set up "trade missions" (with diplomatic immunity) inside India at New Delhi, Calcutta, Kalimpong; Indians to seek entry into Tibet only along six specified passes and not to seek entry at all into the "closed territory" of Sinkiang. India also for the first time recognized Tibet as an integral part of Red China.
And in return? Nehru & Co. expressed great pleasure at the trade pact's preamble, to wit: respect for each other's "territorial integrity" and "noninterference" in each other's domestic affairs. Nehru expected that Red China would thereby relax its border pressure, and Indians happily believe him. "Another step to consolidate our friendship with China," said the Indian Express. "A triumph of diplomacy," glowed the Hindustan Times.
Menon's pettishness did nothing to help India's case. "People here," said a Canadian delegate, "are not so much pro-Pakistan or pro-India as they are anti-Menon. Every time he opens his mouth, people want to vote against him."
-Time, India Grabs It, Feb 04, 1957
Nehru on being pointed by Chinese military designs on the NEFA by an Indian Foreign Service:
"...not quite an objective or balanced view as it was colored very much by certain conceptions".
- Claude Arpi, Tibet. The Lost Frontier
But after eleven long years, the zeal to build a brave new India is cooling. The national leadership, from Nehru down to the lowliest babu, seems more tired than inspired. The ruling Congress Party politicos, in their 60s and 70s, seem reluctant to make way for younger men. Corruption, cynicism and maladministration have dulled the nation's spirit. India still produces more babies than it does food to feed them. (Its population increases at the rate of about 5,000,000 a year, nullifying all gains in agricultural productivity.) Money that could help prop the economy goes into the military budget in fear of a possible war with Pakistan over Kashmir.
Worst of all, India has been brought to the edge of bankruptcy by its overambitious second five-year plan, which has now run half its course. Foreign nations, from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R., have poured some $1.7 billion into the plan. New Finance Minister Desai, taking office five months ago, slashed the plan to its essentials, but India's exchange gap still widens. Because of the recession, foreign firms were able to deliver goods to India faster than was anticipated, and they demanded prompt payment at a time when the principal Indian exports—tea, cotton textiles, jute—were suffering from declining earnings.
-Time, Billion-Dollar Troubles, Sep 1, 1958
When [in 1959] I, as GoC-in-C Eastern Command, met Menon in Delhi, I opened the subject [of defence against the Chinese] with him. In his usually sarcastic style he said that there would be no war between India and China and [if there was] he was quite capable of fighting it himself at the diplomatic level.
- Gen S.P.P. Thorat, Reveille to Retreat
Essence of conversation between Defence Minister Krishna Menon and Maj Gen Sam Manekshaw in 1958 about Gen KS Thimayya, CoAS:
Menon: What do you think about Thimayya?
Sam: I am not permitted to 'think' about my Chief.
Menon: Stop your British way of thinking. I can get rid of Thimayya, if I want.
Sam: You can get rid of him. But then I will get another Chief, and I won't be allowed to think about him too. You know, it is very wrong to ask a Major General what he thinks of the chief. Tomorrow, you will be asking a Brigadier what he thinks of me. This is not done in the army.
-Maj. Gen. VK Singh (ex Jt. Sec, RAW), Leadership in the Indian Army, p. 196
Nehru the Prime Minister no longer remembers or adheres to the ideals or dreams that Jawahar the Rebel had... [H]e can no longer arouse his people as he did in years gone by, for he has allowed himself to be surrounded by those who are known to be opportunists and the entire Government machinery, corrupt and heavy with intrigue, rules the land of no hope of an honest hearing from any quarter.
-Krishna Hutheesing (Betty), My brother - Then and Now, A Study of Nehru (Ed Rafiq Zakaria)
(Note: Krishna was the sibling of Nehru.)
Historically, Nehru warned, a strong China has always been expansionist, and his policy all along—he insisted—has been to try and deal with this reality, not to ignore it or pretend it did not exist. "I do not think there is any country in the world which is more anxious for peace than the Soviet Union . . . but I doubt if there is any country in the world which cares less for peace than China today."
Closing the debate, Nehru first gave support and tribute to Krishna Menon as a man who was sometimes wrong ("I know his faults"), but who had, nevertheless, "the deepest patriotism." Of himself, Nehru said dramatically: "If this house thinks my manner of carrying on in this situation is not adequate, then the honorable members are free to choose another Prime Minister." The result was a thunderous voice vote of confidence which drowned out the one or two "Noes" of stubborn dissenters.
I hope I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese... God bless you all.
-Gen. KS Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) until 1961, on the eve of his retirement.
I cannot even, as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own; we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security.
-Gen. K S Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) until 1961, in Seminar Magazine in 1962.
I charge him (Menon) with wasting the money of a poor and starving nation. I charge him with having created cliques in the Army. I charge him with having lowered the morale of the Armed Forces. I charge him with the neglect of the defences of the country against the aggression of Communist China.
-Acharya Kripalani, during debate in Parliament, Apr 11, 1961
On April 11, 1961, Kripalani delivered what was described at the time as "perhaps the greatest speech that has been made on the floor of that House since Independence". This was a blistering attack on the Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon. Under Menon's stewardship, said Kripalani, "we have lost 12,000 square miles of our territory without striking a single blow" (this was a reference to the Chinese takeover of Aksai Chin.) Army promotions, he claimed, were based not on merit but "according to the whims and fancies of the Defence Minister or what will suit his political and ideological purposes". Menon had "created cliques (and) lowered the morale of our Forces". In a stinging indictment, Kripalani charged the Minister with "wasting the money of this poor and starving nation", with "the neglect of the defence of the country", and with "having lent his support to the totalitarian and dictatorial regimes against the will of the people of freedom".
Kripalani ended his speech with an appeal to the conscience of the members of the ruling party. Recalling how, back in 1940, the Conservative Members of the British Parliament had compelled their Prime Minister to resign, he appealed to those "Congressmen who were not afraid of the British bullets and bayonets to place the good of the nation above the good of the party". With this parting shot Kripalani sat down, to vigorous applause from the Opposition benches.
On this day the galleries of the Lok Sabha were packed to overflowing. Senior civil servants and army officers had heard Kripalani, and they were to hear Menon too. The Defence Minister admitted to shortages of officers and equipment, yet held that the Government had taken all steps necessary to defend our borders. He claimed that "on the Chinese border there has been deployment of troops in the country in such a way that incursions into our territory are impossible". Our borders were safe, insisted Menon, and "the morale of the Indian army higher than ever before".
His final visit to the United States occurred in November 1961, during the presidency of a man who had long admired him, John F. Kennedy. But Nehru was at his worst, moody and sullen at times, didactic and superior at others. The two statesman failed to hit it off; JFK was later quoted as saying this was the worst state visit he had suffered. Nehru no longer attracted uncritical admiration. His positions, both domestic and international, were seen by many as hypocritical.
-Shashi Tharoor, Nehru: The Invention of India, p. 207
India, said Nehru, would not be bullied by the Red Chinese. He revealed that in a note from Peking, Red China had issued a veiled threat to India that it might send troops across the frontier. India, said Nehru, would "resist and repel" such measures. "I do not rule out war," he told the Parliament. "We are friendly with every country in the world. But we will fight with China. My desire is to avoid it but not to submit as well. If we have to take such a step, we will take it." But, he added, "I am free to confess to this house that my soul reacts against war anywhere. That is the training I received throughout my life, and I cannot easily get rid of it at the age of 72." In typical phraseology, he added: "We will be able to get this aggression vacated, through pressure and other things, without getting the whole world involved in war."
The speech was notably briefer than the Panditji's customary Independence Day oration. Without mentioning Communist China, he warned: "People living across our borders look at us with hostile eyes and occasionally talk of war. I hope there won't be any war, but let us be prepared." Preparedness, he emphasized earlier at a press conference, does not include allying India with Asia's anti-Communist nations or joining "some military bloc." "Even if disaster comes to us on the frontier," he said, "I am not going to let India rely on foreign arms to save its territory."
Three years before, Thapar’s predecessor Thimayya submitted resignation after having had a clash with Menon, and was humiliated and humbled under the name of "civil supremacy." This marked a point of no return in the Indian Army, and Thapar failed to offer his resignation. Brigadier Dalvi, much lower in rank, finally submitted resignation in protest and wrote later: "Resignation is the last constitutional resort of a service chief in a democratic set up … this is the only safeguard against incompetent, unscrupulous or ambitious politicians."
-Neville Maxwell, India’s China War
Nehru fortnight ago appointed Lieut. General B. M. Kaul, 50. to act as "Commander of the Special Task Force to Intensify Operations Against the Chinese Intruders." A tough, Sandhurst-educated antiCommunist, Kaul was placed on indefinite leave last August after he questioned Defense Minister Krishna Menon's appeasement policy toward Red China. Kaul's new assignment from Nehru: ''To free our territory in the northeast frontier." Said Nehru at week's end: India's forces are "strongly positioned and in a large number operating from higher ground than the Chinese."
The "swift and massive retribution" for our attempt to disturb the de-facto boundary shook Gen. Kaul, who saw the first Chinese attack develop. His first reaction was the one of disbelief, shock and disillusionment. "Oh my God", he cried, "You are right, they mean business". That is what we had been trying to tell him all along but he had preferred to believe the clap-trap prevalent in Delhi. His moment of "challenging grandeur" had turned into disaster.
He then turned to me, "This is your battle. This is a brigade battle".
-Brig. John P Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. 292-3
After the Tseng-Jong skirmish of the 10th October, this paper (The Times, London) commented: "There is no apparent realisation here (New Delhi) of the magnitude of the military contest which India may now have begun. Observers in a position to know better are still speaking lightly of a swift action to eject the 300/400 Chinese. Official accounts of continued strengthening of the original Chinese Force have been ignored." It is incredible that an itinerant journalist should have reached a more incisive judgment of events than those with the resources of the entire Governmental machine.
-Brig. John P Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. 329
How tough, became clear when the next day, during a break in the NDC meeting, the Prime Minister took Chavan aside to discuss the previous evening's meeting. He was upset that Pratap Singh Kairon had dared to talk so bluntly. He said, "You see, they want Menon's blood. If I agree, tomorrow they will ask for my blood."
Nehru's apprehensions were proved right. The very next day at a marathon meeting of the Executive Committee of the Party, senior Congress parliamentarian, Mahavir Tyagi, MP and the Secretary of the Executive Committee, Raghunath Sighh, MP, asked for Menon's head. When Nehru shouted at the members and threatened to dismiss them all, they were not intimidated. They clearly indicated that no one as bigger than the country and Menon had to go."
-R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival, p. 10-11
(R.D. Pradhan was the Private Secretary to Y.B. Chavan, the new Defence Minister of India)
(R.D. Pradhan was the Private Secretary to Y.B. Chavan, the new Defence Minister of India)
On October 31, Nehru took over the Defense portfolio as Menon continued in a new post in the Cabinet as a Minister for Defense Production. This change was mooted years before and dismissed, but it was a typical political style of Nehru to flout Menon’s critics by having Menon relinquishing the Defense portfolio. Suspicious that the change meant nothing but a title, the following day the political correspondents quoted Menon as saying "nothing has changed" in the working of the Defense Ministry. On November 7, Nehru played his last card to defend Menon in front of the Congress Parliamentary Party. He suggested that complaint against Menon should be leveled at the entire Government and that if resignations were wanted he might have to proffer his own. A leading Congressman replied: "Yes, if you continue to follow Menon’s policies we may have to live without you too." Next day Menon’s resignation was announced.
-Neville Maxwell, India’s China War
On Nov. 7, Nehru attended an all-day meeting of the Executive Committee of the parliamentary Congress Party and made a final plea for Menon, whose intellect, he said, was needed in the crisis. As a participant recalls it, ten clenched fists banged down on the table, a chorus of voices shouted, "No!" Nehru was dumfounded. It was he who was used to banging tables and making peremptory refusals. Taking a different tack, he accurately said that he was as much at fault as Menon and vaguely threatened to resign. Always before, such a threat had been sufficient to make the opposition crumble with piteous cries of 'Panditji, don't leave us alone!" This time, one of the leaders said: "If you continue to follow Menon's policies, we are prepared to contemplate that possibility." Nehru was beaten and Menon thrown out of the Cabinet.
Having no other choice, Nehru at long last appealed to the West for military help. Still trying to preserve his nonaligned stance, he insisted that he did not want to join any military alliance and that India would pay for the weapons some time in the future. Both the U.S. and Britain played along. After loading at arms depots in West Germany and Turkey, U.S. transport planes headed for India with automatic weapons, heavy mortars and mountain howitzers. British transports brought in Bren and Sten guns. France promised arms and helicopters. In New Delhi, U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Galbraith hailed the airlift of arms, but warned, "I hope no one will imagine they will work magic,'' because "the great task remains with the Indian army."
Nehru on Nov 19, 1962: "We shall require more help because it is a matter of survival for us. We have asked for every kind of help. There is no inhibition about it".
-Brig. John P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. 329
When I asked whether he had consulted the Air Chief, Sarin replied that he was not authorised to consult anyone else: the only persons who knew about the contents of the draft letter other than the PM and himself were the Foreign Secretary and, now, we two.
-Gen. DK Palit, War in High Himalayas, p.342.
(DK Palit was then a Brigadier and was Director, Military Operations. The issue being discussed was Nehru's letter to Kennedy asking for twelve squadrons of F-104 fighters and two squadrons of B-57 bombers. Sarin was Joint Secretary, MoD. John Lall was the other person being referred to, who was then Joint Secretary in MoD, incharge of air force matters.)
Nehru, without consulting anybody in his Cabinet, wrote two letters to Kennedy describing the situation as 'really desperate' and requesting the immediate dispatch of a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till Indian personnel had been trained.
"Nehru also sought two B-47 bombers squadrons from the US to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the US."
-Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru - A Biography
(Gopal was the son of former president Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and a Director in the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. He worked closely with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.)
These efforts by the Administration were unable to prevent what in Delhi appeared to be an imminent disaster of cataclysmic proportions. Prime Minister Nehru, himself commanding the war effort, felt constrained on 19 November to write two urgent letters for immediate delivery to Kennedy. Ambassador B.K. Nehru took both to the White House. It appears that Nehru consulted only the Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai in writing these two letters. Both carried the same message, the second sounding slightly more urgent than the first. Nehru described the situation as ‘really desperate’ and requested the immediate dispatch to India of at least 12 squadrons of all-weather supersonic fighter-interceptors to be flown by US airmen. He also asked for the immediate installation of a radar communications network to be manned by US personnel for the airdefence of Indian cities from Chinese attack until Indian staff had been trained to take over from the Americans. There was a further request for the deployment of US-operated aircraft to assist the Indian Air Force in engaging the Chinese in combat in Indian air space. Nehru also asked for the dispatch of two squadrons of B-47 strategic bombers to enable India to attack Chinese bases and air fields but these would be flown by Indian crew whose members were to be immediately sent to the US for training. Nehru assured Kennedy that ‘All such assistance and equipment would be utilized solely against the Chinese’. As a political backstop to these requests, Nehru sought a strategic alliance with the United States which would not only transform Indo-US relations, but also force a major realignment of regional, perhaps even global, partnerships forged as part of Washington’s Containment policy.
-S. Mahmud Ali, Cold war in the high Himalayas, p. 152
As India's poorly equipped army reeled under the Chinese blows, the West moved swiftly and without recrimination to India's defense. Shortly after the Chinese attack, frantic Indian officers simply drove round to the U.S. embassy with their pleas for arms and supplies. Eventually their requests were coordinated. During the tense week of the Cuban crisis, U.S. Ambassador to India Kenneth Galbraith was virtually on his own, and he promised Nehru full U.S. backing.
When Washington finally turned its attention to India, it honored the ambassador's pledge, loaded 60 U.S. planes with $5,000,000 worth of automatic weapons, heavy mortars and land mines. Twelve huge C-130 Hercules transports, complete with U.S. crews and maintenance teams, took off for New Delhi to fly Indian troops and equipment to the battle zone. Britain weighed in with Bren and Sten guns, and airlifted 150 tons of arms to India. Canada prepared to ship six transport planes. Australia opened Indian credits for $1,800,000 worth of munitions.
Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot graphically defined the U.S. mission. "We are not seeking a new ally," he said. "We are helping a friend whose attic has been entered by a burglar." In Washington's opinion, it mattered little that the burglar gratuitously offered to move back from the stairs leading to the lower floors and promised not to shoot any more of the house's inhabitants. "What we want," said Talbot, "is to help get the burglar out."
To that end, a U.S. mission headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman and U.S. Army General Paul D. Adams flew to New Delhi to confer with Indian officials on defense requirements. Soon after, Britain's Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys arrived with a similar British mission. Their most stunning discovery: after five years under Nehru's hand-picked Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, the Indian army was lamentably short of ammunition even for its antiquated Lee Enfield rifles.
Misbehaving People. So far, the fighting has shown that the Indians need nearly everything, except courage. Chinese burp guns fire 20 times faster than Indian rifles. The Indian 25-pounder is a good artillery piece, but is almost immobile in the mountains and cannot match the Chinese pack artillery, recoilless guns and bazookas. Each Chinese battalion has a special company of porters whose job it is to make sure the fighting men have ample ammunition and food. The Indians must rely on units from their unwieldy Army Service Corps, who were never trained to operate at heights of 14,000 feet and over mule paths. In addition to bulldozers and four-wheel-drive trucks, the Indians need mechanical saws that can match the speed of those the Chinese use to cut roads through forests.
Nehru, himself, was still speaking softly and some Western observers felt, snidely in Parliament. Explaining why India had not purchased automatic arms from the West before now, Nehru said: "The House knows that the arms racket is the worst racket of all. If they know you want something, they will make you pay for it through the nose." By waiting until China invaded India, Nehru pointed out, he was able to get British and U.S. arms "in large numbers" and "on very special terms."
Nehru hinted that he would welcome a truce on reasonably favorable terms. But when Nuclear Disarmer Bertrand Russell asked India to accept the present Chinese terms "in the interest of world peace." Nehru, who has often given similar advice to the West, flatly rejected the notion; the Red terms would imply a major loss of Indian territory. The invasion, he told Parliament, "has lifted the veil from the face of India—a serene face, calm yet strong, an ancient face which is ever young. I don't think we will ever forget this powerful, emotional upheaval. No country that evokes this feeling in a moment of crisis can ever be suppressed.''
Clinging to the idea that if Russia aids India, it will not supply China, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru played up the Soviet promise to send MIG jet fighters to the Indian air force. When Britain's Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys suggested in London that chances of delivery seemed slim, Nehru retorted tartly that he had "authoritative information" that the MIGs would be Delivered.
In any case, Nehru knew roughly what he wanted from the U.S. in military aid. His shopping list had Pentagon eyes popping: a whopping $1 billion worth of weapons and equipment for 1963 alone. India's entire national budget for fiscal 1963 is less than $3 billion.
A few days later Chavan again experienced this strong sense of resentment (in army) when Nehru decided to visit Leh in the middle of December. He asked Chavan to accompany him and cautioned him to keep his visit secret. Nehru was apprehensive of his own security. S.S. Khera, the Cabinet Secretary had been asked to make all the arrangements in absolute secrecy. On his return, talking about the visit to Leh, Chavan told me that he did not know why Nehru visited the place at all. Although he addressed the troops, his speech was dull. The old vitality was gone. They were curious to see him but the spontaneous response of the past was missing. The jawans stood around in stony silence and listened to Nehru without a single round of applause. This was most unusual.
-R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival, p. 45-6
We deplaned and were greeted with correct military protocol, tinged with a chill reserve. It was only later that I found that we had to clear ourselves of the charge of having been brainwashed – a strange charge from a Government which had itself been brainwashed into championing China’s cause for more than a decade.
-Brig. John P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. xiv
(Describing how he felt when Chinese deported him after capturing as a prisoner of war.)
Apparently the Prime Minister was worried that an enquiry by army officers would result in the army trying to throw the blame on politicians. Chavan assured Nehru that he had talked to General Chaudhuri, the COAS, who in turn had assured him that no such attempt would be made. Chavan added, "PM is behaving like a man with a guilty conscience."
-R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival, p. 78
There is further evidence that Chaudhuri did not wish the enquiry to dig too deep, range too widely, or excoriate those it faulted. The following were the terms of reference he set: Training; Equipment; System of command; Physical fitness of troops; Capacity of commanders at all levels to influence the men under their command. The first four of those smacked of an enquiry into the sinking of the Titanic briefed to concentrate on the management of the shipyard where it was built and the health of the deck crew; only the last term has any immediacy, and there the wording was distinctly odd -- commanders do not usually 'influence' those they command, they issue orders and expect instant obedience.
But Henderson Brooks and Bhagat (henceforth HB/B) in effect ignored the constraints of their terms of reference and kicked against other limits Chaudhuri had laid upon their investigation, especially his ruling that the functioning of Army HQ during the crisis lay outside their purview. 'It would have been convenient and logical', they note, 'to trace the events [beginning with] Army HQ, and then move down to the Commands for more details… ending up with field formations for the battle itself'. Forbidden that approach, they would, nevertheless, try to discern what had happened at Army HQ from documents found at lower levels, although those could not throw any light on one crucial aspect of the story -- the political directions given to the Army by the civil authorities.
As HB/B began their enquiry, they immediately discovered that the short rein kept upon them by the Army chief was by no means the least of their handicaps. They found themselves facing determined obstruction in Army HQ, where one of the leading lights of the Kaul faction had survived in the key post of director of military operations -- Brigadier D K Palit.
At this (when a stunned Nehru asked why Gen. Thorat did not show the paper on NEFA written for him, to which the latter implicated Menon) Nehru exploded: 'Menon, Menon! Why have you got your knife into him? You people do not realise what an intellectual genius he is.'
Thorat said: 'If he is, Sir, I have seen no evidence of it in the case under consideration.' Nehru glared at him angrily for a few seconds. Then he smiled and said: 'You know, Thorat, you Maharashtirans are like mules. Normally you are good and docile, but once you dig your toes in, it is impossible to dislodge you.'
-Maj. Gen. VK Singh (ex Jt. Sec, RAW), Leadership in the Indian Army, p. 145
The government's case was not notably helped by Krishna Menon, who, in his first major speech in Parliament since he was sacked as Defense Minister last winter, made the curiously unguarded admission that the government's nonalignment policy was based, not on principle, but merely on "our desire to keep our skins whole and entire."
There is one more thing and I have finished. Members referred to my remark last year, soon after the Chinese invasion took place. I had said that we had been living in a world of unreality. What exactly had I meant by it? I cannot catch my mood at the time wholly but what I meant was this world is cruel. We thought in terms of carrying the banner of peace everywhere and it has betrayed us. Our efforts at peace and following the path of peace have been knocked on the head. Now we have to take war; we are forced much against our will. This is what I meant. I was not thinking of any particular policy but the outlook with which we had been faced.
-Nehru (PM referring to Nov 1962), during debate in Parliament on Sep 3, 1963
(Also see: Time, The Psychosis of Fear, Jan 04, 1954)
Chavan was shocked to learn that some training centers (of the army) even lacked .303 Enfield rifles for training. Instead, the recruits were being trained with bamboo sticks or lathis. Consequently many units had become mere showpieces or as Krishan Menon derisively called them a 'parade ground army'.
-R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival, p. 235
The nation’s pride was wounded; its honour compromised, its very existence as a free nation endangered. Mr. Chavan’s statement admits that such an injury was inflicted on this nation, but it refused to disclose who were responsible for this injury and this anxiety to shield the guilty is paraded as being the paramount necessity of national security. The public must be kept in the dark in public interest – indeed (an) extraordinary logic.
Mr. Chavan’s statement, pinpointing this extraordinary state of unpreparedness of this country, says that there were no arms even for training, much less for defence; there was no proper orientation, there was no transport, there were no proper roads, no equipment, no intelligence, no leadership, no command. All these elements which make up the complex pattern of the apparatus of modern defence were missing. Nothing was available, which forms the fighting arm of the country. Only, we had a very active defence minister and a very expensive defence ministry.
The truth of the matter is that this government did not understand, did not realize, did not grasp the true significance and the meaning of the menace posed by Chinese expansionism. The reasons are very simple… They were the victims of their own slogan. They were prisoners of their own political preferences and prejudices. They were paralysed by their pussillnimity, they were hypnotized by their credulity, by their gullibility. It was the failure of our political leadership from which flow our military failures.
-Nath Pai, during debate on still classified Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat report in Parliament on Sep 21, 1963
I remember many a time when our senior generals came to us, and wrote to the defence ministry saying that they wanted certain things... If we had had foresight, known exactly what would happen, we would have done something else... what India has learnt from the Chinese invasion is that in the world of today there is no place for weak nations... We have been living in an unreal world of our own creation.
-Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajya Sabha, 1963
Note: Instead of "I", Nehru used the collective "we", a clear indication of his reluctance to own up his own mistakes as a man.
-Wing Commander (retd) R V Parasnis, Remebering a war, Rediff.com, Dec 05, 2002.
When the inevitable disaster came Nehru did not even have the grace or courage to admit his errors or seek a fresh mandate from the people. He did not even go through the motion of resigning; he merely presented his trusted colleagues and military appointees as sacrificial offerings. This was a great disappointment to his many admirers all over the world. President Nasser, who is not overly devoted to parliamentary democracy, made a more gracious and democratic gesture after the crushing Egyptian defeat at the hands of the Israelis, in June 1967. He accepted the blame and remained in power only when he was given a fresh mandate from the people.
-Brig. John P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. 249
